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The United States’ Position on the Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Obligations: 
Give It Up 
 
Beth Van Schaack

 
 
A. Introduction 
 
The extraterritorial application of states’ human rights obligations has emerged as a pressing 
issue in international human rights law.
1
  And, it is destined to remain so given that states are 
increasingly asserting their power abroad in ways that affect the rights of individuals beyond 
national borders.
2
  Although not confined to this context,
3
 the debate has been most heated in 
connection with modern-day armed conflicts that entail states deploying their troops and other 
personnel on the territory of one or more other states but in confrontation with insurgents, 
terrorists, and other non-state actors.  Although transnational in their scope and impact, 
international humanitarian law (IHL) considers these conflicts to be non-international armed 
conflicts (NIACs), because they do not pit two or more High Contacting Parties of the 1949 
Geneva Conventions against one another—the technical predicate for an international armed 
conflict (IAC).
4
  Most conflicts in the world today are NIACs, yet the positive law governing 
targeting decisions, detention operations, and the range of other issues that arise in these conflicts 
is significantly less developed than that governing IACs.  Moreover, these situations may evolve 
in and out of full-blown conflict, effectively switching IHL on and off.
5
  The impulse to look to 
human rights law to provide added constraints on state behavior, offer a remedy for victims of 
violence, and fill lacunae in—or backstop—the applicable IHL is thus a compelling one.  As a 
result, the question of the extraterritorial application of human rights obligations has become 
entangled in the choice of law debate over when human rights law applies in situations of armed 
conflict that are also governed by IHL.
6
  In many of today’s transnational NIACs, however, the 
                                                          

 Visiting Scholar, Center on International Security & Cooperation, Stanford University.  By way of disclosure, I 
served as Deputy in the Office of Global Criminal Justice of the U.S. Department of State from 2012-2013.  My 
office did not participate in the drafting of submissions to human rights bodies.  The views expressed herein are 
entirely my own and do not reflect the position of the State Department or the U.S. government.  
1
 Examples of the leading scholarship in this area are: MARKO MILANOVIC, EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES: LAW, PRINCIPLES, AND POLICY (2011); KAREN DA COSTA, THE EXTRATERRITORIAL 
APPLICATION OF SELECTED HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES (2013). 
2
 Kal Raustiala, A Response to Milanovic, OPINIOJURIS, http://opiniojuris.org/2011/12/02/a-response-to-milanovic/ 
(noting the increase in states’ “ability to project power at a distance, and to move people to distant places” as well as 
conflicts that that seem “to bleed over to many discrete locations that are neither subject to pervasive armed conflict 
nor are belligerently occupied”; all of which make “the extraterritorial application questions far harder, but also far 
more pertinent.”). 
3
 The issue of the extraterritorial application of human rights law can also arise in connection with states’ policies 
and conduct in the realms of immigration, trade, development, participation in international organizations, national 
security outside of any armed conflict, peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations, foreign intelligence, and 
law enforcement.  
4
 Article 2, Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Civilian Persons in Time of War (“GC IV”) (August 
12, 1949), T.I.A.S. 3365. 
5
 Sarah Cleveland, A Response to Milanovic, OPINIOJURIS, http://opiniojuris.org/2011/12/05/a-response-to-
milanovic-2/. 
6
 A number of competing paradigms govern the question of when IHL displaces, or must be harmonized with, other 
potentially applicable bodies of law, including human rights law and domestic law.  For background see Charles P. 
Trumbull, Filling the “Gaps” in the Law Applicable to Non-International Armed Conflicts, INTERCROSS, 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2390191 
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question of the extraterritorial application of human rights law must be resolved before it can be 
determined which human rights obligations apply alongside any applicable IHL rules.  This 
article aims to focus on this antecedent question. 
 
As domestic courts, international tribunals, and human rights treaty bodies increasingly confront 
fact patterns and claims requiring a consideration of whether a particular human rights obligation 
applies extraterritorially, they have struggled to create a defensible and coherent framework of 
analysis.  This process of doctrinal development and evolution has been decentralized to a 
certain degree since the various human rights instruments contain slightly different formulations 
for their scope of application, and there is no appellate body to harmonize the law.  Nonetheless, 
through a process of cross-fertilization and parallel reasoning, a doctrinal convergence is now 
discernable within the opinions and other views of authoritative decision-makers representing the 
range of human rights treaty bodies and tribunals that have confronted the issue.  According to 
this consensus, states owe human rights obligations to all individuals within the authority, power, 
and control of their agents or instrumentalities and can be found responsible whenever they cause 
harm to such individuals.  In terms of which rights and obligations apply extraterritorially, 
human rights bodies are increasingly adopting a calibrated approach that hinges on the nature of 
the right, the degree of control the state exercises over the territory, individuals, or transaction in 
question.     
 
Starting in 1995, but more consistently during the Bush Administration, the United States has in 
its filings before these human rights bodies
7
 advanced a categorical and contrarian position that 
the obligations contained in the relevant human rights instruments have no extraterritorial 
application.
8
  This unqualified position is increasingly out-of-step with the established 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
http://intercrossblog.icrc.org/blog/contemporary-ihl-challenges-use-force-and-non-international-armed-conflicts; 
Beth Van Schaack, The Interface of IHL and IHR: A Taxonomy, JUSTSECURITY, 
http://justsecurity.org/2013/10/08/interface-ihl-ihr-taxonomy/.  
7
 A number of human rights treaties have established committees of independent experts who are charged with 
supervising state compliance with treaty undertakings through periodic state reporting, the issuance of general 
comments (akin to advisory opinions) and reports, and quasi-adjudicatory claims procedures undertaken in 
connection with individual petitions.  Given its ratification status, the United States is subject to four out of the eight 
of these bodies operating under the auspices of the UN High Commissioner of Human Rights: the Human Rights 
Committee (which monitors the ICCPR), the Committee Against Torture (which monitors the Torture Convention), 
the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (same for the Convention on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination), and the Committee on the Rights of the Child (the US has ratified two Optional Protocols to the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) but not the parent treaty).  The United States has not yet ratified the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESC), the Convention on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, or the UN 
Committee on Migrant Workers and their Families, each of which has a corresponding experts committee.  In 
addition, the United States is also subject to the supervisory jurisdiction of the International Labor Organization’s 
Committee of Experts and Committee on Freedom of Association and—by virtue of its membership of the 
Organization of American States (OAS)—the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), although it 
contests the full reach of that Commission as will be discussed.  The Human Rights Committee, which monitors the 
ICCPR, accepts individual petitions; however, the United States has not ratified the necessary Optional Protocol.  
See generally Tara Melish, From Paradox to Subsidiarity: The United States and Human Rights Treaty Bodies, in 
THE SWORD AND THE SCALES: THE UNITED STATES AND INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 210 (Cesare P.R. 
Romano, Ed. 2009).  
8
 Most recently, in the face of a proposal by Brazil and Germany to recognize an international right to privacy, the 
United States succeeded in ensuring that the final General Assembly resolution did not mention any extraterritorial 
impact.  See Colum Lynch, Inside America’s Plan to Kill Online Privacy Rights Everywhere, FOREIGN POLICY 
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jurisprudence and with arguments being advanced, and conceded, by our coalition partners and 
other allies.
9
  As such, the United States now finds itself in a knotty adversarial posture with 
several human rights bodies on this issue and the related choice of law question.
10
   
 
This firm stance confirms the United States as a persistent objector to any emerging customary 
norm.  Nonetheless, the failure to acknowledge limited, well-established, and principled 
exceptions to a strictly territorial application of its human rights obligations ultimately 
undermines the legitimacy of U.S. arguments in these fora as well as its commitment to the 
human rights project more broadly.  The upcoming hearings before the Human Rights 
Committee (HRC)—the treaty body charged with interpreting the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)—offer an opportunity for the Obama Administration to 
advance a more nuanced position that allows it to remain faithful to its lex specialis arguments, 
but also to make certain strategic concessions on extraterritoriality.
11
  The proposed shift in 
approach will demonstrate the United States’ respect for the views of human rights bodies and of 
its allies, bolster the universality of certain core human rights protections, and do much to bring 
to a close a historical chapter marred by allegations that the United States was endeavoring to 
create, and exploit, rights-free zones.  Furthermore, the change of course advocated will not 
prejudice, and may actually enhance, more meritorious arguments at the United States’ disposal.  
 
This dispute is more than a simple matter of competing semantics and treaty interpretations that 
will be resolved by clever exercises of statutory interpretation or a more searching review of the 
legislative history.  Rather, there are broad philosophical principles at issue that go to the very 
heart of the human rights project.  In particular, this debate surfaces a perennial tension between 
the idealized vision of human rights as universal attributes that we all enjoy simply by virtue of 
our shared humanity and the more realist view that human rights obligations are merely 
contractual undertakings that are binding only insofar as states have specifically consented to 
them as a function of pacta sunt servanda.  And yet, the applicable texts are open to several 
equally plausible interpretations, and the legislative history is inconclusive as to states’ original 
intentions; this indeterminacy invites a teleological interpretive approach that must prioritize 
universality. The law has headed in a direction that is consistent with this imperative and is 
keeping pace with globalization and multitude of ways that states can assert their power abroad.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
(Nov. 20, 2013) (“American diplomats are pushing hard to kill a provision of the Brazilian and German draft which 
states that ‘extraterritorial surveillance’ and mass interception of communications, personal information, and 
metadata may constitute a violation of human rights. … The United States negotiators have been pressing their case 
behind the scenes, raising concerns that the assertion of extraterritorial human rights could constrain America’s 
effort to go after international terrorists.”). 
9
 See Cleveland, supra note ___ (cataloging submissions by United States allies).  The U.S. position is closest to that 
advanced by the Government of Israel, given that the issue of extraterritoriality of human rights obligations has deep 
implications with respect to the occupied territories, along with Canada and the United Kingdom.  On Israel’s 
position, see Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory 
Opinion, ICJ Reports 2004 (9 July 2004), ¶ 110.   
10
 See Geneva 001769, UN Human Rights Committee—USG July 17018 Public Hearing, available at 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/131739.pdf, ¶¶ 11-12 (delegation cable noting that the HRC had 
“pointedly critical” questions and comments and was “strongly opposed to the United States’ longstanding and 
principled legal interpretation (which the delegation resolutely defended) that the Covenant does not apply to 
activities of States Parties outside their territory”). 
11
 These proceedings were originally scheduled for November, 2013, but the sequester negotiations prevented the 
U.S. delegation from traveling.   CITATION. 
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This is fitting, because the alternative—that the treaties would permit states to harm people 
abroad in ways that would be prohibited at home—is untenable and perverse.   
 
The United States’ so-called legal position actually reflects a strategic policy choice to endeavor 
to evade scrutiny of its extraterritorial exploits on the merits.  Given that there are well-
developed arguments that its conduct in the range of conflicts in which it finds itself is in full 
compliance with applicable law—be it human rights law or humanitarian law12—the United 
States should have nothing to fear from relinquishing a threshold argument that is increasingly 
untenable in light of the prevailing practice, law, and theory.  Indeed, by abandoning this dead 
letter, the United States will increase the legitimacy of other arguments in its defense, including 
its lex specialis arguments in favor of the application of IHL over human rights law in the 
situations of greatest concern to the United States: the conduct of military operations abroad, 
including through the use of remotely piloted vehicles. 
 
This paper proceeds in four steps.  By way of background, it quickly reviews the relevant treaty 
language and travaux préparatoires.  With reference to exemplary decisions, it then maps the 
process of doctrinal development across the array of human rights treaty bodies and international 
tribunals (with a nod to some relevant domestic pronouncements) in order to identify the 
expanding areas of doctrinal consensus.  Against this backdrop, it presents the United States’ 
rhetorical positions before several human rights bodies.  By way of prescription and conclusion, 
it suggests some subtle concessions the United States could make in the forthcoming 
consultations before the Human Rights Committee, where it has reached a “stalemate” on this 
question.
13
  Although at first glance the United States position appears deeply entrenched, subtle 
cues in the United States’ most recent submission to the HRC suggests that its position on these 
issues may be softening and that the time for such a shift in approach may be ripe. 
 
B. The Texts & Their Origins 
 
The various human rights treaties and instruments contain slightly different formulations for their 
scope of application.  Several hortatory pronouncements, such as the 1948 Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights (UDHR), do not contain any jurisdictional limitations at all, framing their 
articulated rights as universally applicable to all persons under all circumstances.
14
  This is also 
                                                          
12
 See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, The Obama Administration and International Law, American Society of 
International Law (25 Mar. 2010). http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm.  
13
 See Cleveland, supra note ___.   
14
 Article 2 of the UDHR states: 
 
Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction 
of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or 
social origin, property, birth or other status. Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis 
of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person 
belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of 
sovereignty. 
 
The 1948 American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man similarly states at Article II: “All persons are equal 
before the law and have the rights and duties established in this Declaration, without distinction as to race, sex, language, 
creed or any other factor.” 
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the approach of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and their Protocols
15
 as well as the 1948 Genocide 
Convention.
16
  Similarly, the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR) does not contain a jurisdictional clause and actually obliges states parties to 
take steps individually and through “international assistance and cooperation” to progressively 
realize the Covenant’s rights.17  By contrast, the rest of the human rights treaties, many of which 
are subject to enforcement or interpretation by a supranational court or expert body, do contain 
jurisdictional limitations.  The most common formulation relies on the concept of the state 
party’s “jurisdiction”, which is susceptible to multiple interpretations beyond merely the state 
party’s “territory.”18  For example, several treaties impose their obligations with respect to all 
“territory under [the state party’s] jurisdiction”19 implying that the two terms are not 
synonymous.  Indeed, none of these treaties is expressly territorial in the sense contemplated by 
Article 29 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
20
 
 
The European Court of Human Rights’ (ECHR) decisions concerning the European Convention 
on Human Rights—which are enforceable against states within the Council of Europe—have 
been highly salient in this debate.  The most important treaty from the United States’ perspective, 
however, is the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), so this paper will 
conduct a deeper dive into its text, origins, and subsequent interpretation.  That said, many of our 
key allies and coalition partners are subject to the European Convention and Court, and so the 
latter’s jurisprudence will be scrutinized in so far as it impacts and is consistent with the 
direction the law has moved.   
 
                                                          
15
 For example, Common Article 1 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions provides: “The High Contracting Parties 
undertake to respect and to ensure respect for the present Convention in all circumstances.”  GC IV, supra note ___. 
16
 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Res. 260 (III) (9 Dec. 1948); Case 
Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and 
Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), Prel. Obj., Judgment, ICJ Reports 1996 (11 July 1996), at ¶ 31 (“[T]he rights and 
obligations enshrined in the Convention are rights and obligations erga omnes.  …  [T]he obligation each state has 
to prevent and to punish the crime of genocide is not territorially limited by the Convention.”).   
17
 Article 2(1) provides in full:  
 
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and through 
international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical, to the maximum of 
its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights 
recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption 
of legislative measures. 
 
18
 Article 1 of the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights reads: “The High Contracting Parties shall secure to 
everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section 1 of this Convention.”  Article 2 of the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child makes reference to the duty of states parties to both respect and to ensure the 
enumerated rights to “each child within their jurisdiction.” 
19
 The 1966 Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination provides at Article 3 that: “States Parties 
particularly condemn racial segregation and apartheid and undertake to prevent, prohibit, and eradicate all practices 
of this nature in territories under their jurisdiction.”  Similarly, the 1984 U.N. Convention Against Torture (Article 
2(1)) states: “Each State Party shall take effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent 
acts of torture in any territory under its jurisdiction.”  The treaty also confirms at Article 2(2) that a state of war 
cannot be invoked to justify acts of torture.  
20
 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, entered into force Jan. 27, 1980.  Article 29 reads: 
“Unless a different intention appears from the treaty or is otherwise established, a treaty is binding upon each party 
in respect of its entire territory.”  
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The ICCPR, which opened for signature in 1966, contains a unique and enigmatic formulation, 
in which much turns on the meaning of the second “and” in Article 2(1), italicized below: 
 
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all 
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized 
in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind…21 
 
This formulation is susceptible to three competing interpretations.  The first reading of Article 
2(1) is a conjunctive one advanced by the United States to mean that a state subject to the ICCPR 
owe duties only to those individuals who are within both its territory and its jurisdiction.  This 
interpretation, while perhaps most semantically natural one, creates some conceptual oddities 
with certain Covenant rights, such as the right to return to one’s country enshrined in Article 
12(4).
22
  A disjunctive interpretation of Article 2(1) yields the more expansive conclusion that 
the Convention actually applies to two classes of individual: persons within the state’s territory 
as well as persons within the state’s jurisdiction.  In any case, to avoid surplusage, both 
approaches depend on the ability to identify examples of persons who are within a state’s 
territory, but not its jurisdiction, and vice versa.  The former would, under certain circumstances, 
include diplomats assigned to international organizations as well as persons on a portion of the 
territory of a state party that is controlled by a rebel or insurrectionist entity or is otherwise 
outside of the central government’s jurisdiction in the sense of power or effective control.  
Although such cases arise, the case law is more often concerned with identifying the latter class 
of persons: those individuals who are not within the state’s territory but are nonetheless within its 
jurisdiction.   
 
In 2005, the Human Rights Committee issued General Comment 31, an omnibus opinion on the 
“Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant.”23  The 
Committee adopted the first disjunctive approach to Article 2(1) when it wrote: 
 
States Parties are required by article 2, paragraph 1, to respect and to ensure the 
Covenant rights to all persons who may be within their territory and to all persons 
subject to their jurisdiction.
24
 
 
Finally, an alternative disjunctive approach to Article 2(1) has emerged whereby the territorial 
clause modifies only the obligation to “ensure” Covenant rights (in the sense of taking positive 
                                                          
21
 Article 7 of the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of 
Their Families, adopted by GA Res. 45/158 (18 Dec. 1990), contains a more expressly disjunctive formula: 
 
States Parties undertake, in accordance with the international instruments concerning human 
rights, to respect and to ensure to all migrant workers and members of their families within their 
territory or subject to their jurisdiction the rights provided for in the present Convention without 
distinction of any kind ... 
 
22
 See MANFRED NOWAK, U.N. COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS CCPR COMMENTARY 43 (2d ed. 2005) 
(“An expressly literal reading would … lead to often absurd results.”). 
23
 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 31, Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States 
Parties to the Covenant, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (May 26, 2004).  General comments are authoritative 
but technically non-binding pronouncements on treaty interpretation.  
24
 Id. at ¶ 10. 
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steps to give effect to rights and to prevent and redress the violation of those rights by third 
parties), which would apply only to individuals within states’ territory and subject to their 
jurisdiction.  States would be obliged to “respect” the rights set forth in the Covenant under all 
circumstances, without territorial limitation.
25
  This distinction between what have been called 
negative and positive obligations finds some affinity in the formulation of the contemporaneous 
American Convention on Human Rights (1969), which embodied within a treaty many of the 
rights contained in the American Declaration.  The American Convention states at Article 1(1) 
that:  
 
The States Parties to this Convention undertake to respect the rights and freedoms 
recognized herein and to ensure to all persons subject to their jurisdiction the free 
and full exercise of those rights and freedoms, without any discrimination …26  
 
Similarly, the European Convention on Human Rights in Article 1 identifies the obligation to 
“secure” the enumerated rights and freedoms within states’ jurisdiction, potentially taking for 
granted—as argued by one commentator—that the obligation to “respect” those rights is 
susceptible to no jurisdictional limitation.
27
  In all these formulae, much hinges on what it means 
to be within a state’s “jurisdiction.” 
 
The legislative history of these instruments provides some insight into the intentions of the states 
that negotiated the core texts.   During the drafting of the ICCPR, it was the United States 
delegation that proposed the addition of “within its territory” to Article 2(1), which originally 
only made reference to states’ “jurisdiction.”28  The United States was particularly concerned 
with the prospect of assuming obligations to adopt legislation that would guarantee the rights 
contained in the Covenant to residents of territory occupied since World War II but gradually 
being transitioned to local authorities.
29
  There was also a concern about individuals asserting 
                                                          
25
 Rolf Künnemann, Extraterritorial Application of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, in EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES 201, 228-9 (Fons 
Coomans & Menno T. Kamminga Eds., 2004); Milanovic, supra note ___ (“I thus argue that while the 
state’s overarching positive obligation to secure or ensure human rights even from violations by private 
actors should be conditioned by a spatial notion of jurisdiction as control of an area, since in the 
overwhelming majority of cases the state would need such control to effectively comply with its 
obligations, its negative obligations—e.g. not to kill an individual without sufficient justification—should 
be territorially unlimited, since the state can always refrain from a specific act”). 
26
 The Convention also contains a most favored rights clause at Article 29 providing that nothing in the treaty should 
be interpreted as restricting the enjoyment of the enumerated rights or freedoms or precluding other rights that are 
inherent in the human personality or derived from representative democracy. 
27
 Künnemann, supra note ___, at 229.  The title of this provision, however, is “Obligation to Respect Human 
Rights” (emphasis mine). 
28
 See NOWAK, supra note __, at 30-34.  The reference to persons within the state’s “jurisdiction” replaced a 
reference to persons residing in a state’s “territory” in the European Convention during the drafting period.  See Rick 
Lawson, Life After Banković: On the Extraterritorial Application of the European Convention on Human Rights, in 
EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES 82, 88 (Fons Coomans & Menno T. Kamminga 
Eds., 2004).   
29
 Michael J. Dennis, Application of Human Rights Treaties Extraterritorially in Times of Armed Conflict and 
Military Occupation, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 119, 123-24 (2005) (noting Eleanor Roosevelt’s unwillingness to assume 
“an obligation to ensure the rights recognized in [the Covenant] to the citizens of countries under United States 
occupation” by requiring it to enact legislation concerning those persons who were subject to the jurisdiction of the 
occupying state in some respects, but not others); see also DA COSTA, supra note ___, at 24-40. 
8 
 
rights against their state of origin beyond those that could be fulfilled through standard 
diplomatic protection measures and that would otherwise fall under the competence of the state 
of residence.
30
  Other delegations—primarily concerned with confirming that states retain 
obligations to guarantee the Covenant’s rights to their own citizens abroad—unsuccessfully 
opposed the proposed amendment.
31
   
 
Although drafters finally reached a consensus as to the textual formulation of Article 2, this 
accord does not necessarily evince a consensus as to how that language should be interpreted; 
that question may have deliberately been left ambiguous.  This obscured plurality of views is, of 
course, the risk of joining any multilateral regime.  Thus, given that the text is susceptible to 
multiple interpretations, it may be of no moment that the contemporary approach runs counter to 
the United States’ expectations.  All told, commentators who have really dug into the archives 
have determined that the travaux are inconclusive as to the full intent of the drafters, but—at a 
minimum—these records do not express a clear sentiment the Covenant should never apply 
extraterritorially.
32
  In any case, by the time of U.S. ratification, the HRC had already opined on 
the extraterritorial application of the Covenant.
33
  Nevertheless, this issue was not raised when 
the United States ratified the ICCPR in 1992, even though the Senate attached a number of 
reservations, declarations, and understandings.
34
 
 
Although a semantic analysis of these texts coupled with careful resort to their legislative 
histories provides some insights of relevance, no definitive conclusion as to the treaties’ 
extraterritorial reach can be discerned.  Moreover, although they were concerned with cabining 
the treaty’s impact on situations of occupation, the delegations involved in the drafting 
negotiations were not sufficiently prescient to contemplate all the potential situations in which 
the question of extraterritorial obligations might arise.  When language is indefinite, either 
inadvertently or by design, state representatives in effect delegate interpretive authority to courts 
and other enforcement bodies.  As such, it has been left to the various judicial and quasi-judicial 
bodies with responsibility for administering, interpreting, and ensuring compliance with the 
treaties and other instruments to determine the full scope of their extraterritorial reach, with 
reference to the instruments’ object and purpose as well as subsequent state practice.35   
                                                          
30
 Legal Consequences, supra note ___, at ¶ 109.   
31
 Dennis, supra note___, at 124.  
32
 Dominic McGoldrick, Extraterritorial Application Of The International Covenant On Civil And Political Rights, 
in EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES 41, 66-67 (Fons Coomans & Menno T. 
Kamminga Eds., 2004). 
33
 See, e.g., Lopez-Burgos v. Uruguay, Comm. No. 52/1979, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/13/D/52/1979 (29 July 1981).  
34
 U.S. Reservations, Declarations, and Understandings, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 138 
Cong. Rec. S4781-01 (daily ed., April 2, 1992), available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/usdocs/civilres.html.  
35
 Article 31, Vienna Convention, supra note___.   Human rights treaties are particularly susceptible to this 
teleological interpretative approach.  For example, the ECHR has made clear that the European Convention is a 
“living instrument” that must be interpreted in light of contemporary realities.  Loizidou v. Turkey, 
Judgment/Preliminary Objections, App. No. 15318/89 (23 Mar. 1995), at ¶ 71 (“these provisions [governing both 
substance and enforcement] cannot be interpreted solely in accordance with the intentions of their authors as 
expressed more than forty years ago.”); Soering, supra note __, at ¶ 87 (“the object and purpose of the Convention 
as an instrument for the protection of individual human beings require that its provisions be interpreted and applied 
so as to make its safeguards practical and effective. ... In addition, any interpretation of the rights and freedoms 
guaranteed has to be consistent with ‘the general spirit of the Convention, an instrument designed to maintain and 
promote the ideals and values of a democratic society’) (citations removed). 
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C. The Jurisprudence  
 
The “jurisprudence” in this area has evolved rather haphazardly in the face of idiosyncratic fact 
patterns that have come before different human rights treaty bodies and international tribunals in 
a range of conflict and non-conflict situations.
36
  The ECHR’s jurisprudence tends to receive the 
most attention in this field, but its case law is enhanced and informed by pronouncements by the 
Human Rights Committee, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the Committee 
Against Torture, and other such bodies.
37
  To be sure, many decision-makers preface their 
assertions of jurisdiction with the observation that human rights obligations are primarily 
territorial, suggesting what amounts to a presumption against extraterritoriality unless one of the 
identified exceptions has been proven.  The ECHR is the most wedded to this meme—insisting 
on the “essentially territorial notion of jurisdiction” with “other bases of jurisdiction being 
exceptional and requiring special justification in the particular circumstances of each case.”38  
That said, a longitudinal review of the cases reveals a distinct trend toward an understanding that 
states’ human rights obligations follow their agents and instrumentalities offshore whenever they 
are in a position to respect, or to violate, the rights of individuals they confront abroad.  Even the 
ECHR is gradually bending toward the reasoning of its sister interpretive bodies.  As a result, at 
this point in time, the reach of these various instruments is largely co-extensive, and it is possible 
to identify a taxonomy of situations in which there is a consensus that states’ human rights 
obligations apply extraterritorially.  Even within the ECHR jurisprudence, these so-called 
exceptions are sufficiently numerous and diverse such that the default position is more pocked 
than plenary. Some variation continues to exist, however, in the hard cases: when states engage 
in remote extrajudicial killings.  
 
1. Territorial Actions With Extraterritorial Implications or Effects 
 
One discrete class of situations involves acts committed domestically that have extraterritorial 
human rights implications or effects—so-called indirect extraterritorial effect cases.39    This 
theory of extraterritoriality developed in connection with decisions to extradite, deport, or 
otherwise remove individuals to countries where they may not enjoy the panoply of due process 
                                                          
36
 United Nations political bodies have also weighed in on this issue.  See, e.g., Comm’n on Human Rights, Res. 
1991/67, Doc. E/CN.4/1991/91 (6 Mar. 1991) (condemning Iraq’s grave violations of human rights against the 
Kuwaiti people in violation of the UN Charter, human rights treaties, and other relevant legal instruments, and 
appointing a special rapporteur to investigate the situation of human rights under Iraqi occupation); GA Res. 45/170, 
The Situation of Human Rights in Occupied Kuwait (18 Dec. 1990), at ¶¶ 1, 9 (condemning human rights violations 
against the Kuwaiti people and asking the Commission on Human Rights to examine the human rights situation in 
Kuwait).  By contrast, the Security Council simply reaffirmed Iraq’s responsibility under international humanitarian 
law, including GC IV.  See U.N. Sec. C. Res. 666 (prmbl) (13 Sept. 1990).  The General Assembly has similarly 
called upon Israel to adhere to its human rights obligations in the occupied territories, although that is obviously a 
special case.  See, e.g., GA Res. 2443 (XXII) (Dec. 19, 1968).  
37
 For a fuller survey of these cases, see Oona A. Hathaway et al., Human Rights Abroad: When do Human Rights 
Treaty Obligations Apply Extraterritoriality?, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 389 (2011).  
38
 Banković, supra note ___, at ¶ 61.  
39
 DA COSTA, supra note ___, at 57. 
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protections
40
 or where they may be subject to the death penalty.
41
  The Human Rights Council in 
a General Comment reinforced this line of cases when it wrote: 
 
the article 2 obligation requiring that States Parties respect and ensure the 
Covenant rights for all persons in their territory and all persons under their control 
entails an obligation not to extradite, deport, expel or otherwise remove a person 
from their territory, where there are substantial grounds for believing that there is 
a real risk of irreparable harm … either in the country to which removal is to be 
effected or in any country to which the person may subsequently be removed.
42
  
 
These cases turn on two elements: the state’s exclusive control over the putative victim with 
respect to the decision and destination—even though it may exercise no control over the 
individual once he or she leaves the state’s territory—and the foreseeability of the extraterritorial 
rights violation within the destination state.
43
  The state’s liability is traceable to the fact that it 
operates as “a link in the causal chain that would make possible violations in another 
jurisdiction.”44  This brand of extraterritorial jurisdiction can exist even when a statutory scheme 
enacted by the state party has certain deleterious effects on individuals residing elsewhere.
45
   
 
At the same time, and by way of limiting principle, courts and other bodies have generally 
rejected an unrestricted effects test.
46
  As such, simply being affected abroad by an act 
                                                          
40
 See Cruz Varas and Others v. Sweden, ECHR, Judgment, App. No. 15576/89 (20 Mar. 1991) (finding no violation 
of the Convention where Chilean citizens were refused refugee status and ordered expelled).  
41
 Soering v. United Kingdom, ECHR, Judgment, App. No. 14038/88 (7 July 1989), at ¶ 91 (“liability [may be] 
incurred by the extraditing Contracting State by reason of its having taken action which has as a direct consequence 
the exposure of an individual to proscribed ill-treatment”); Ng v. Canada, HRC, Comm. No. 469/1991, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/49/D/469/1991 (7 Jan. 1994), at ¶ 6.2 (“if a State party takes a decision relating to a person within its 
jurisdiction, and the necessary and foreseeable consequence is that this person’s rights under the Covenant will be 
violated in another jurisdiction, the State party itself may be in violation of the Covenant. That follows from the fact 
that a State party’s duty under article 2 of the Covenant would be negated by the handing over of a person to another 
State (whether a State party to the Covenant or not) where treatment contrary to the Covenant is certain or is the 
very purpose of the handing over.”); Kindler v. Canada, HRC, Comm. No. 470/1991, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/48/D/470/1991 (11 Nov. 1993), at ¶ 6.2 (same); A.R.J. v. Australia, HRC, Comm. No. 692/1996, U.N Doc. 
CCPR/C/60/D/692/1996 (28 July 1997), at ¶¶ 6.12-6.15 (determining that a violation of due process rights was not a 
necessary and foreseeable consequence of petitioner’s return to Iran). 
42
 General Comment No. 31, supra note ___, at ¶ 12.   
43
 Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v. the United Kingdom, ECHR, Judgment, App. No. 61498/08 (4 Oct. 2010), at ¶ 123 
(finding potential liability when individuals are transferred between states where “substantial grounds have been 
shown for believing that the person concerned, if deported, faces a real risk of being subjected to” ill-treatment). 
44
 Munaf v. Romania, HRC, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/96/D/1539/2006 (21 Aug. 2009), at ¶ 14.2.  In Munaf, the 
government attempted to argue that the petitioner was never actually in its custody, although he was in a Romanian 
embassy when he was handed over to U.S. military personnel, who allegedly mistreated him. Id. at ¶¶ 4.10-4.12, 7.5.  
The HRC instead found that the harm to Munaf would not have been foreseeable to Romania at the time and so 
Romania bore no responsibility.  Id. at ¶¶ 14.2-14.6.  
45
 Ibrahim Gueye et al. v. France, HRC, Comm. No. 196/1985, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/35/D/196/1985 (6 April 1989), 
at ¶¶ 9.3-9.5 (finding Senegalese petitioners within France’s jurisdiction when they relied on French legislation for 
their pension rights).   
46
 See Banković, supra note ___, at 75 (“The Court considers that the applicants’ submission is tantamount to 
arguing that anyone adversely affected by an act imputable to a Contracting State, wherever in the world that act 
may have been committed or its consequences felt, is thereby brought within the jurisdiction of that State for the 
purpose of Article 1 of the Convention.”).  To be fair, the Court somewhat unfairly recharacterized the petitioners’ 
arguments in this regard.  See infra text accompanying note ___ (setting forth petitioners’ arguments). 
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attributable to a state (e.g., a diminution of foreign aid) is insufficient to trigger that state’s 
human rights obligations abroad.  Because these cases involve state action that is essentially 
local (such as a decision to extradite an individual abroad), they are of a different order than the 
more contentious situations involving state agents acting overseas.   
 
2. Consular Actions  
 
There is also a discrete set of cases challenging the actions of diplomats and other consular 
representatives operating abroad.
47
  Many of these decisions turn on the right in question (e.g., 
the right to return to one’s country, which inevitably applies beyond national territory) as well as 
the fact that the transaction in question (e.g., the re-issuance of a passport) is within the exclusive 
control or authority of the state representatives.
48
   
 
3. Occupation & Control of Territory 
 
Turning to situations that involve a state’s extraterritorial conduct stricto sensu, the easiest 
scenarios are those in which one state exercises plenary control and authority over physical 
territory within the borders of another state.  Although this can occur when one state exercises 
effective control over an area with the “consent, invitation or acquiescence of the government of 
that territory,”49 the classic such scenario is one of occupation, when an occupying power—
having removed or displaced the local authorities—is under a duty to maintain order and to 
provide for basic needs of the local populace until some indigenous civil authority can resume 
                                                          
47
 See Montero v. Uruguay, HRC, Comm. No. 106/1981, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/2, (1990).  Uruguay had failed to 
reissue the applicant’s passport in Germany. The HRC found the claim to be admissible on the following reasoning: 
 
The issue of a passport to a Uruguayan citizen is clearly a matter within the jurisdiction of the 
Uruguayan authorities and he is “subject to the jurisdiction” of Uruguay for that purpose. 
Moreover, a passport is a means of enabling him “to leave any country including his own”, as 
required by article 12(2) of the Covenant. Consequently, the Committee found that it followed 
from the very nature of that right that, in the case of a citizen resident abroad, it imposed 
obligations both on the State of residence and on the State of nationality and that, therefore, article 
2 (1) of the Covenant could not be interpreted as limiting the obligations of Uruguay under article 
12 (2) to citizens within its own territory.   
 
Id. at ¶ 5 (finding the confiscation of a passport of a Uruguayan citizen by the Uruguayan consulate in 
Germany to be a violation of the right to leave any country, including her own (Article 12(2)).  
48
 See W.M. v. Denmark, App. No. 17392/90, EComm’nHR (14 October 1993), at ¶ 1 (“authorized agents of a State, 
including diplomatic or consular agents, bring other persons or property within the jurisdiction of that State to the 
extent that they exercise authority over such persons or property.  In so far as they affect such persons or property by 
their acts or omissions, the responsibility of the State is engaged.”) (unpubl. op.); Lichtensztein v. Uruguay, HRC, 
Comm. No. 77/1980 (31 Mar. 1983); Dixit v. Australia, HRC, U.N. Doc CCPR/C/77/D/978/2001 (28 April 2003) 
(allegations regarding discriminatory acts of immigration officials deemed inadmissible for failure to exhaust local 
remedies). 
49
 Banković, supra note ___, at ¶ 71.  In Al-Skeini, the UK Court of Appeals somewhat inexplicably held that that 
human rights obligations should not apply extraterritorially when the foreign actor is present without the consent of 
the territorial state, because such application might result in a violation of the territorial state’s sovereignty. Case of 
Al-Skeini & Others v. The United Kingdom, App. No. 55721/07, Judgment (July 7, 2011), at ¶ 80 (discussing the 
holding of the UK Court of Appeal).  This privileging of the sovereign right to non-interference of the territorial 
state over the human rights of the victims has not been widely shared beyond these two judgments.   
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those responsibilities.
50
  These extraterritorial obligations can exist even when actual authority is 
exercised by a local administration under the control of the foreign state.
51
  The International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) confronted a de facto occupation scenario in the Armed Activities case, 
wherein it found Uganda liable not only for abuses by its own troops but also for failing to 
protect the inhabitants from abuses by violent non-state actors not under Uganda’s authority.52  
Inversely, enforcement bodies will effectively let states off the hook in situations in which they 
do not exercise control or authority on their own territories as a result of foreign occupation.
53
   
 
It is often assumed the occupier bears responsibility for securing the entire range of substantive 
rights in the territory in question,
54
 especially during prolonged occupations.
55
  Placing human 
                                                          
50
 EYAL BENVENISTI, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OCCUPATION 105 (1993) (describing the Fourth Geneva 
Convention as “a bill of rights” for the occupied population).  In Al-Skeini, however, the United Kingdom conceded 
that the region in question was within British military responsibility; nonetheless, it argued that it did not have 
sufficient troops or resources on the ground to exercise effective control over the territory in question or the local 
civilian administration.  Al-Skeini, supra note ___, at ¶ 112.  It also conceded jurisdiction over British-run prison 
facilities in Iraq, but not over any actions undertaken in the military vehicle transporting detainees to those facilities.  
Id. at ¶ 118. 
51
 In Loizidou, Turkey argued that the acts in question were attributable to an autonomous local administration.  The 
Court rejected this, however, by reasoning:  
 
when as a consequence of military action—whether lawful or unlawful—[a Contracting State] 
exercises effective control of an area outside its national territory. The obligation to secure, in such 
an area, the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention derives from the fact of such control 
whether it be exercised directly, through its armed forces, or through a subordinate local 
administration.   
 
Loizidou, supra note ___, at ¶ 69.  See also Cyprus v. Turkey, ECHR, App. No. 25781/94, Judgment (10 May 2001) 
at ¶ 77 (“Having effective overall control over northern Cyprus, [Turkey’s] responsibility cannot be confined to the 
acts of its own soldiers or officials … [b]ut must also be engaged by virtue of the acts of the local administration 
which survives by virtue of Turkish military and other support.”).   
52
 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, ICJ Rep. 
2005, 179 (19 Dec. 2005).  
53
 Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Cyprus, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add. 88 (6 Aug. 
1998), at ¶ 3 (“the State party, as a consequence of events that occurred in 1974 and resulted in the occupation of 
part of the territory of Cyprus, is still not in a position to exercise control over all of its territory and consequently 
cannot ensure the application of the Covenant in areas not under its jurisdiction.”).  This may also occur in situations 
in which a state dissolves into constitutive parts that exercise only tenuous control over parts of their newly-acquired 
territory. See, e.g., Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee, Bosnia and Herzegovina, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/79/Add.14 (1992), at ¶¶ 4-5 (noting with approval that while Bosnia-Herzegovina did not exercise “factual 
and effective control” over its entire territory, it nonetheless considered itself legally responsible for all parts of its 
territory). 
54
 Cyprus v. Turkey, supra note ___, at ¶ 77 (because Turkey had effective control over Northern Cyprus, and 
because its control was plenary, it was obliged to secure the entire range of substantive Convention Rights: … 
“Turkey’s ‘jurisdiction’ must be considered to extend to securing the entire range of substantive rights … and  … 
violations of those rights are imputable to Turkey.”).  The ECHR invalidated Turkey’s efforts to limit the reach of 
the European Convention’s enforcement machinery to “the national territory where the Constitution and the legal 
and administrative order of the Republic of Turkey are applied.” See Loizidou, supra note ___, at ¶¶ 65-89.  
55
 See Legal Consequences, supra note ___, at ¶¶ 107-113 (considering the extraterritoriality of the ICCPR, the 
ICESCR, and the CRC).  In the Wall case, the ICJ cited concluding observations of the HRC taking note of “‘the 
long-standing presence of Israel in [the occupied] territories, Israel’s ambiguous attitude towards their future status, 
as well as the exercise of effective jurisdiction by Israeli forces therein’” and concluded that the ICCPR “‘is 
applicable in respect of acts done by a State in the exercise of its jurisdiction outside its own territory.’”  Id. at ¶ 110.  
The situation involving Israel and the Occupied Territories is obviously sui generis and may not be susceptible to 
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rights obligations on an occupying power is complicated by the general proposition of 
occupation law, termed the “conservationist principle,”56 that local law and institutions should be 
preserved
57
 except insofar as they inhibit mission accomplishment, undermine order and 
security, interfere with the occupying power’s ability to adhere to other IHL commitments, or—
increasingly—when local laws or institutions themselves violate international human rights 
protections.
58
  The earlier account of the legislative history of the ICCPR reveals this paradox.  
The phenomenon of occupation was at the forefront of delegates’ minds in the 1950s when the 
ICCPR was being drafted, and the United States in particular was acutely concerned about 
assuming an obligation to exercise prescriptive jurisdiction in the areas that it occupied.  That 
said, in modern times, the resonance of this aspect of the Covenant’s legislative history has 
diminished considerably, and adjudicative bodies are comfortable with the general proposition 
that areas under occupation fall within a state’s “jurisdiction” for the purpose of applying that 
state’s human rights obligations extraterritorially.   
 
Adjudicative and quasi-adjudicative bodies have applied this territorial approach to other 
scenarios that fall short of full occupation but still involve de facto control—lawful or 
unlawful—of some physical domain within the borders of another state.  Such 
responsibility will lie where there is “overall control” even if the state party does not 
exercise detailed “control over the policies and actions of the authorities in the area 
situated outside its national territory.”59  This includes application to peacekeepers, who 
are assigned to a particular territory but who remain the responsibility of the troop-
contributing state to the extent that the nationality state has the ability to ensure that its 
troops respect the rights of the local populace.
60
  This rationale has also applied to 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
easy extrapolation to other circumstances.  Moreover, Israel is subject to disproportionate attention in human rights 
bodies.  Nonetheless, the HRC’s conclusion is notable: “in the current circumstances, the provisions of the Covenant 
apply to the benefit of the population of the Occupied Territories … for all conduct by the State party’s authorities 
or agents in those territories affecting the enjoyment of rights enshrined in the Covenant.” Human Rights 
Committee, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant, Concluding 
Observations of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/ISR/CO/3 (29 July 2010), at ¶ 5. 
56
 See generally Gregory H. Fox, Transformative Occupation and the Unilateralist Impulse, 94 INT’L REV. OF THE 
RED CROSS 237 (Spring 2012); id. at 256-8 (noting tension between states’ extraterritorial human rights obligations 
and the conservationist principle of occupation law).  
57
 For example, Article 43 of the Hague Regulation provides that “the authority of the legitimate power having in 
fact passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as 
far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the 
country.”  Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Annex to Convention [IV] Respecting 
the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 18 Oct. 1907.  See also Article 64, Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Treatment of Civilian Persons in Time of War (GC IV) (August 12, 1949), T.I.A.S. 3365. 
58
 See BENVENISTI, supra note ___, at 92 (finding “an obligation not to enforce local norms that are incompatible 
with the obligations to protect the human rights of the occupied population.”).   
59
 Issa and Others v. Turkey, App. No. 31821/96 (16 Nov. 2004), at ¶ 70.  
60
 See Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee, Belgium, U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/81/BEL (8 Dec. 
1998), at ¶ 6 (stating that the Covenant automatically applies whenever a party “exercises power or effective control 
over a person outside its territory ... such as forces constituting a national contingent assigned to an international 
peacekeeping or peace enforcement operation.”); Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee, 
Germany, U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/80/DEU/Add.1 (4 Nov.  2005) (noting with approval Germany’s assurances that 
“[w]herever its police or armed forces are deployed abroad, in particular when participating in peace missions, 
Germany ensures to all persons that they will be granted the rights recognized in the Covenant, insofar as they are 
subject to its jurisdiction.”).  This position has not been accepted by all troop-contributing states.  See Concluding 
Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Netherlands, U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/72/NET (27 Aug. 2001), at ¶ 8; 
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situations in which the state exercises authority over more discrete venues, such as 
prisons
61
 or vessels,
62
 including vessels flying the flag of other nations.
63
  In fact, some of 
the cases challenging the acts of diplomatic or consular officials with respect to 
individuals abroad can be assimilated to this more localized territorial theory.  As the 
spatial unit of analysis becomes smaller and smaller, however, the control-over territory 
exception begins to resemble, and eventually collapse into, a test hinging the state’s 
exercise of control over persons—both its agents and the victims.64   
 
4. State Control and Authority over Persons 
 
Arguably, a strict application of the territorial control thesis was destined to disappoint in light of 
the simple fact that states are capable of violating the rights of individuals abroad without fully 
controlling the territory or situs on which those violations occur.  The HRC was confronted in 
the late 1970s with a set of cross-border abduction cases that led to the development of a state-
agent-authority or control-of-persons test.  In these snatch-and-grab operations, the HRC held 
Uruguay to its human rights obligations when its authorities crossed international borders in 
pursuit of individuals and forcibly brought them back into national territory.
65
  Because the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Replies of the Government of the Netherlands to the Concerns Expressed by the Human Rights Committee, U.N. 
Doc. CCPR/CO/72/NET/Add.l (9 April 2003), at ¶ 19 (“[t]he Government disagrees with the Committee’s 
suggestion that the provisions of the [ICCPR] are applicable to the conduct of Dutch blue helmets in Srebrenica. ... It 
goes without saying that the citizens of Srebrenica, vis-à-vis the Netherlands, do not come within the scope of 
[Article 2]”). 
61
 Al-Saadoon, supra note ___, at ¶¶ 79-88 (treating two Iraqi nationals detained in British-controlled military 
prisons in Iraq as within the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom notwithstanding arguments that the United 
Kingdom was not exercising any public powers through the effective control over territory); Al-Jedda v. the United 
Kingdom, ECHR, Judgment, App. No. 27021/08 (7 July 2011).  In Al-Jedda, the United Kingdom did not advance 
the extraterritoriality argument; rather, it argued that the petitioner was under the jurisdiction of the United Nations, 
since British troops were operating as part of a multinational force in Iraq.  The Court held that because the 
petitioner was detained in a facility controlled exclusively by British soldiers, he was within the United Kingdom’s 
jurisdiction.  Id. at ¶ 85.  
62
 Öcalan v. Turkey, ECHR, Decision on Admissibility, App. No. 46221/99 (14 Dec. 2000).  In Öcalan, the 
applicant was arrested by Turkish officials while boarding a plane in Nairobi.  The strength of this precedent is 
somewhat diminished by the fact that Turkey did not raise objections as the court’s ratione loci during the 
admissibility phase of the proceedings.   
63
 Medvedyev and Others v. France [GC], ECHR, Judgment, App. No. 3394/03, § 67 (29 Mar. 2010) (finding 
applicants within French jurisdiction by virtue of the exercise by French agents of de facto “full and exclusive 
control” over a ship and its crew from the time of its interception in international waters “in a continuous and 
uninterrupted manner”).  
64
 See, e.g., Al-Skeini, supra note ___, at ¶ 136 (“What is decisive in such cases is the exercise of physical power and 
control over the person in question.”).  Indeed, in his separate opinion in Al-Skeini, Judge Rozakis argued that the 
state agent and control test should actually be considered a corollary of the territorial control test.   Id. at Concurring 
Opinion of Judge Rozakis.   
65
 Lopez-Burgos, supra note ___; Celiberti de Casariego v. Uruguay, Comm. No. 56/1979, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/13/D/56/1979 (1981) (finding the abduction of Uruguayan citizens by Uruguayan agents in Brazil to be a 
violation of the applicants’ rights).  In Lopez-Burgos, the HRC wrote:  
 
Article 2(1) places an obligation upon a State party to respect and to ensure rights … but it does 
not imply that the State party concerned cannot be held accountable for violations of rights under 
the Covenant which its agents commit upon the territory of another State, whether with the 
acquiescence of the Government of that State or in opposition to it. … [I]t would be 
unconscionable to so interpret the responsibility under article 2 of the Covenant as to permit a 
15 
 
alleged victim was usually a citizen of the state seeking custody, these cases are susceptible to an 
alternative explanation premised on nationality; however, the applicable reasoning does not 
necessarily confine itself to such facts.
66
  Moreover, the HRC made clear in General Comment 
No. 15 that the ICCPR’s protections extend beyond state party nationals, foreclosing any analogy 
to social compact theories that might limit states’ human rights obligations to their own citizens 
or subjects.
67
  The HRC later ratified the control-of-persons standard in General Comment No. 
31: 
 
[A] State party must respect and ensure the rights laid down in the Covenant to 
anyone within the power or effective control of that State Party, even if not 
situated within the territory of the State Party. … This principle also applies to 
those within the power or effective control of the forces of a State Party acting 
outside its territory, regardless of the circumstances in which such power or 
effective control was obtained...
 68
 
 
Applying this concept of agent control or authority over the person is most easily applied in 
standard custodial situations, such as prisons,
69
 which can also be more easily analogized to the 
control of territory.  This rationale is also regularly invoked, however, in situations in which the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
State party to perpetrate violations of the Covenant on the territory of another State, which 
violations it could not perpetrate on its own territory. 
 
Id. at ¶ 12.3.  For a more modern abduction case, see V.P. Domukovsky et al. v. Georgia, HRC, Comm. No. 623, 
624, 626, 627/1995, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/62/D/623, 624, 626, 627/1995 (29 May 1998) (Georgia violated applicants’ 
rights when it abducted them from Azerbaijan, which had refused extradition); Öcalan v. Turkey, ECHR [GC], 
Judgment, App. No. 46221/99, (DATE), at ¶ 91 (“directly after being handed over to the Turkish officials by the 
Kenyan officials, the applicant was effectively under Turkish authority and therefore within the ‘jurisdiction’ of that 
State for the purposes of Article 1 of the Convention, even though in this instance Turkey exercised its authority 
outside its territory.”). 
66
 The separate opinion of Christian Tomuschat in Lopez-Burgos could be so interpreted:  
 
[t]he formula [“within its territory”] was intended to take care of objective difficulties which might 
impede the implementation of the Covenant in specific situations. Thus, a State party is normally 
unable to ensure the effective enjoyment of the rights under the Covenant to its citizens abroad, 
having at its disposal only the tools of diplomatic protection with their limited potential. … Never 
was it envisaged ... to grant States parties unfettered discretionary power to carry out wilful and 
deliberate attacks against the freedom and personal integrity of their citizens living abroad. 
Consequently, despite the wording of article 2(1), the events which took place outside Uruguay 
come within the purview of the Covenant. 
 
Individual opinion submitted by a member of the Human Rights Committee under rule 94 (3) of the Committee’s 
provisional rules of procedure, Lopez-Burgos, supra note ___.   
67
 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 15 (11 Apr. 1986), U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (Vol. I) (“the 
general rule is that each one of the rights of the Covenant must be guaranteed without discrimination between 
citizens and aliens” except insofar as a right is applicable only to citizens, such as the right to vote (Article 25)). 
68
 General Comment No. 31, supra note ___, at ¶ 10. 
69
 Indeed, in the domestic Al-Skeini proceedings, the U.K. Divisional Court found that military operations in the 
field did not fall within the United Kingdom’s jurisdiction, but the custodial deaths did—a point later conceded by 
the government.  Al-Skeini, supra note ___, at ¶ 118.  
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individual is in the full custody of the state’s agents, even if not detained in a formal facility.70  
This state-agent-authority theory becomes more fraught, however, when remote conduct is at 
issue, such when a state harms an individual through extraterritorial targeting decisions involving 
lethal force without ever exercising physical custody of the victim.   
 
The first human rights body to confront this hard case was the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights in the form of a challenge to the Cuban Air Force’s downing of small civil aircraft 
operated by the Brothers to the Rescue in international airspace.
71
  Without the benefit of much 
in the way of prior precedent, the Commission proved remarkably prescient in articulating a 
theory of power and authority over the victims, notwithstanding that the victims were never in 
the actual custody of Cuban personnel: 
 
The circumstance that the facts occurred outside the Cuban jurisdiction does not 
restrict nor limit the Commission’s competent authority ratione loci, for, as has 
already been indicated, when agents of a State, whether they be military or civil, 
exercise power and authority over persons located outside the national territory, 
its obligation to respect human rights, in this case the rights recognized in the 
American Declaration, continues.
72
 
    
Presumably, this reasoning could apply to a whole range of remote extraterritorial killings. 
 
Nonetheless, the ECHR rejected the Commission’s approach in the “Brothers to the Rescue” 
case in the controversial Banković case, involving NATO airstrikes on a television station in 
Serbia during the 1999 Operation Allied Force.
73
  Petitioners argued that jurisdiction existed on a 
number of grounds:  an “effects” test based on actions initiated within the territories of the 
respondent states but producing effects in the former Yugoslavia; a control-of-territory test 
premised on NATO’s exclusive control of the airspace over Belgrade; and the proportional 
application of human rights obligations with reference to the degree of power exercised over the 
individual victims. The respondent governments in turn argued that states have human rights 
obligations only toward individuals owing some sort of allegiance to the State or in some form of 
“structured relationship existing over a period of time.”74   
 
The ECHR adopted a largely territorial approach to the Convention and declared the claims 
inadmissible owing to the fact that the extraterritorial act in question did not bring the claimants 
into the jurisdiction of the respondent states.
75
  In so holding, the Court made little of several 
other cases involving Turkey (Loizidou, Issa and Öcalan) that were premised upon the 
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Id. at ¶¶ 59-60.   
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extraterritorial actions of Turkish state agents.  These cases could be distinguished because, 
although they had already been deemed admissible, the respondent state had either not yet 
challenged admissibility or the merits were still pending.
76
  The ECHR also justified departing 
from this line of precedent with reference to the essentially regional character of the European 
Convention.  So, in the Cyprus line of cases, a finding that Turkey’s obligations did not apply 
extraterritorially would have denied human rights protections to individuals who would normally 
have enjoyed them and left what amounted to a rights void.  By contrast, Banković involved 
harm to citizens of Serbia—which at the time fell outside the espace juridique of the European 
Convention—who had no history or expectation of protection from the Convention.77  This 
regional approach to the extraterritoriality question is unique to the ECHR and has been largely 
abandoned in its more recent jurisprudence.
78
 
 
It cannot be gainsaid that the outcome in Banković may have been motivated by a number of 
extra-legal concerns, including a devotion to the humanitarian impulses behind the Operation, 
which was launched in order to halt and prevent egregious violations of human rights.  Indeed, 
the respondent states argued that asserting jurisdiction over the facts at bar would discourage 
states from contributing to such missions.
79
  Moreover, Banković was decided after 9/11 and just 
after the initiation of Operation Enduring Freedom, which may also have heightened the ECHR’s 
sensitivities to assigning human rights obligations in extraterritorial armed conflict situations.
80
  
 
Although Banković threatened to significantly curtail the extraterritorial reach of the European 
Convention, subsequent cases have all but limited it to its facts.
81
  Issa v. Turkey, for example, 
involved the abduction and extrajudicial killing of Iraqi shepherds, allegedly by Turkish forces 
operating in northern Iraq—another state outside the espace juridique of the European 
Convention.
82
  The Court confirmed that: 
 
According to the relevant principles of international law, a State’s responsibility 
may be engaged where, as a consequence of military action—whether lawful or 
unlawful—that State in practice exercises effective control of an area situated 
outside its national territory. The obligation to secure, in such an area, the rights 
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and freedoms set out in the Convention derives from the fact of such control, 
whether it be exercised directly, through its armed forces, or through a 
subordinate local administration. It is not necessary to determine whether a 
Contracting Party actually exercises detailed control over the policies and actions 
of the authorities in the area situated outside its national territory, since even 
overall control of the area may engage the responsibility of the Contracting Party 
concerned.
83
 
 
Looking to the HRC’s Uruguayan line of cases, the ECHR held that “the Convention cannot be 
interpreted so as to allow a State party to perpetrate violations of the Convention on the territory 
of another State, which it could not perpetrate on its own territory.”84  Likewise, in Öcalan v. 
Turkey, another cross-border arrest case, the applicant—Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK) leader 
Abdullah Öcalan—was arrested in Kenya by Turkish security services.  The ECHR ruled that as 
soon as he was transferred from Kenyan to Turkish custody, the individual in question was under 
“effective Turkish authority and control and was therefore brought within the ‘jurisdiction’ of 
that State.”85  In Medvedyev, the ECHR offered another somewhat garbled way to distinguish 
Banković when it noted that the primarily territorial notion of jurisdiction “excluded situations, 
however, where—as in the Banković case—what was at issue was an instantaneous 
extraterritorial act, as the provisions of Article 1 did not admit of a ‘cause-and-effect’ notion of 
jurisdiction.”86   
 
Issa and Öcalan involved victims in the custody of state agents.  Even more telling, Pad and 
Others v. Turkey was brought by the families of several Iranian individuals killed by fire from a 
Turkish helicopter patrolling the border.  That the facts were unclear as to whether the events in 
question occurred on Turkish or Iranian soil was of no moment since “the Court considers that it 
is not required to determine the exact location of the impugned events, given that the 
Government has already admitted that the fire discharged from the helicopters had caused the 
killing of the applicants’ relatives…”87  The causal role of the state in the rights violation proved 
relevant in Pad’s finding that the victims fell within the state’s jurisdiction as compared to 
Medvedyev’s rejection of the relevance of causality.  
 
The impact of Banković diminished even further once Al-Skeini v. the United Kingdom came 
before the ECHR.
88
  In the domestic incarnation of Al-Skeini, the British lower courts adopted 
the Banković reasoning to reject claims by Iraqi citizens who were fatally shot by British soldiers 
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during patrols and search-and-arrest operations in Iraq.
89
  When this case reached the ECHR 
(with Article 13 claims alleging that the U.K. failed to conduct an appropriate investigation as 
opposed to claims under Article 2 alleging violations of the right to life), a newly constituted 
chamber of the Court largely rejected the Banković reasoning.  Instead, the ECHR held:  
 
the United Kingdom assumed authority and responsibility for the maintenance of 
security in South East Iraq. In these exceptional circumstances, the Court 
considers that the United Kingdom, through its soldiers engaged in security 
operations in Basrah during the period in question, exercised authority and control 
over individuals killed in the course of such security operations, so as to establish 
a jurisdictional link between the deceased and the United Kingdom for the 
purposes of Article 1 of the Convention.
90
 
 
At least part of this finding hinges on the fact that the United Kingdom voluntarily undertook 
responsibility for the maintenance of security in the region following the removal from power of 
the Ba’ath regime and prior to the establishment of an Interim Government.91 On balance, this 
affirmative assumption of responsibility coupled with clear causality and the close proximity 
between the victims and British agents established the “jurisdictional link” necessary to satisfy 
Article 1 of the European Convention.
92
   
 
In the meantime, the Inter-American Commission was confronted with facts similar to those at 
issue in Banković in an inter-state claim brought by Ecuador against Colombia on behalf of an 
Ecuadoran victim of Operation Phoenix, during which the Colombian Air Forces bombed a 
FARC camp located within Ecuador.
93
  The aerial bombing was followed by a ground incursion 
in which some of the wounded and killed were removed.
94
  Colombia contested jurisdiction on 
the ground that Operation Phoenix did not entail military occupation or control over Ecuadoran 
territory or armed groups therein.
95
 Acknowledging Banković,96 the Commission determined 
that:    
 
the exercise of authority over persons by agents of a State even if not acting 
within their territory, without necessarily requiring the existence of a formal, 
structured and prolonged legal relation in terms of time to raise the responsibility 
of a State for acts committed by its agents abroad. At the time of examining the 
scope of the American Convention’s jurisdiction, it is necessary to determine 
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20 
 
whether there is a causal nexus between the extraterritorial conduct of the State 
and the alleged violation of the rights and freedoms of an individual.
97
  
 
The Commission adopted a calibrated approach when it held:  
 
[This] does not necessarily mean that a duty to guarantee the catalogue of 
substantive rights established in the American Convention may necessarily be 
derived from a State’s territorial activities, including all the range of obligations 
with respect to persons who are under its jurisdiction for the (entire) time the 
control by its agents lasted. Instead, the obligation does arise in the period of time 
that agents of a State interfere in the lives of persons who are on the territory of 
the other State, for those agents to respect their rights, in particular, their right to 
life and humane treatment.
98
 
  
For the purposes of admissibility, the Commission determined that Colombia exercised 
extraterritorial jurisdiction over the area attacked.
99
  
 
In light of the above, it remains to be seen how the ECHR will address scenarios that fall 
between the facts of Banković (wherein state agents are entirely remote from the victim in 
question, exercise little to no territorial control, but can still cause harm through air superiority or 
the deployment of remote weaponry) and those of Al-Skeini (wherein the state voluntarily 
assumed some measure of control over a territory and a population in a situation of quasi-
occupation).  At a minimum, Issa, Pad, and Al-Skeini lay the groundwork for a revisiting of 
Banković’s reliance on a territorial control as a precondition to hold a state responsible for the 
commission of remote extrajudicial killings.  Obviously, as the state and its agents and 
instrumentalities become more and more remote, the jurisdictional link between the state and the 
victim could become too attenuated to extend the obligations of the European Convention.  
However, the paradox of allowing a state to avoid its human rights obligations by remaining 
distant in its choice of means and methods of war will not be lost on human rights 
adjudicators.
100
  Arguably, the operator of a remotely piloted vehicle exercises the same degree 
of control—if not more so—over his or her target as the British troops exercised over their 
victims in Issa.  
 
5. Gestalt Approaches 
 
The human rights bodies have evinced a tendency to proceed case-by-case, in keeping with the 
non ultra petita rule, rather advance more generally applicable principles.  Although this iterative 
approach to a new doctrinal area is common, in this context, it has generated an academic 
critique that the human rights bodies, and the ECHR in particular, have failed to create a 
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coherent doctrinal framework for determining the extraterritorial reach of state’ human rights 
obligations.
101
  Accordingly, particular judges and commentators have advanced more gestalt 
approaches.  For example, Judge Bonello in Al-Skeini argued in his separate opinion that events 
should fall within a state “jurisdiction” whenever the state is capable of performing the basic 
obligations of a functional human rights regime: refraining from violations, investigating 
complaints of abuses, punishing responsible individuals, and compensating victims.
102
  
Conversely, territory, individuals, or events would fall outside the state’s jurisdiction in 
situations in which a state is not in a position to respect or to ensure particular rights because it 
could not control the rights abusers, could not investigate complaints, could not punish 
responsible individuals, or could not compensate the victims.  This capacity-based analysis 
ensures that human rights obligations are not “interpreted in such a way as to impose an 
impossible or disproportionate burden” on states.103  Thus: 
 
It is quite possible to envisage situations in which a Contracting State, in its role 
as an occupying power, has well within its authority the power not to commit 
torture or extra-judicial killings, to punish those who commit them and to 
compensate the victims—but at the same time that Contracting State does not 
have the extent of authority and control required to ensure to all persons the right 
to education or the right to free and fair elections: those fundamental rights it can 
enforce would fall squarely within its jurisdiction, those it cannot, on the wrong 
side of the bright line.
104
   
 
In other words, obligations should be commensurate with capacity.  The theory that 
causation and capacity create the necessary “jurisdictional link” would more easily 
govern remote targeting decisions that are clearly attributable to the state but that might 
not entail any exercise of physical control over the victims.  In addition, rather than 
premising responsibility on a theory of control over the individual analogized from the 
control-over-territory precedent, a system could be devised that hinges on the 
“relationship between the individual and the state in relation to a violation of any of the 
rights set forth in the Covenant, wherever the violations occurred”105 and the fact that the 
state exercises causal control over the “facts and circumstances that allegedly constitute a 
violation of a human rights.”106   
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Any more functional or calibrated theory of the extraterritorial application of human rights 
obligations will depend on a willingness to accept the divisibility of the human rights corpus—a 
corollary doctrinal dilemma that gave some decision-makers pause early on.  There are two ways 
this corpus may be sliced: one approach focuses on the types of substantive rights that may—as a 
matter of logic, status, and practicality—apply extraterritorially.  The second focuses on the 
types of state obligations (i.e., the duty to respect rights versus the duty to ensure or even to 
promote them) that may—also as a matter of logic and practicality—apply extraterritorially.  It 
should be noted that the question is not whether the individuals who are being acted upon enjoy 
the entire corpus of human rights—they do.  Rather, the question is: which state should be the 
guarantor of those rights?  When a state acts on the territory of another sovereign, it may assume 
certain human rights obligations vis-à-vis the citizens and residents of that territory that apply in 
parallel with the extant obligations of the territorial state.  Under other circumstances, such as 
total occupation, the foreign state may fully displace the territorial state as rights guarantor.    
 
The early impulse of many human rights bodies was to insist upon the indivisibility of the corpus 
of human rights.
107
  Indeed, in Banković, the ECHR resisted the applicants’ claims that rights 
should apply proportionately to the degree of control over the individuals exercised by the 
state.
108
  This perspective was rights-promoting in that it guarded against efforts to rank order or 
even to divide and conquer rights.  This insistence on unity, however, invited binary arguments 
in opposition to efforts to apply certain rights extraterritorially in circumstances in which it might 
be appropriate.  Opponents need only raise the specter of a foreign state owing an obligation to 
promote the right to education, religion, or political participation when it acts abroad to undercut 
extraterritoriality arguments.  
 
In the alternative, or in addition, the extraterritorial application of rights may be disaggregated 
with reference to the nature of the state’s obligation vis-à-vis the right rather than the nature of 
the substantive right itself.  As discussed, human rights treaties articulate different types of 
obligations with respect to their enumerated rights.  The obligation to “respect” a particular right 
creates a “duty of forbearance” and hinges on the state’s own conduct as manifested by the 
actions of its agents and instrumentalities.
109
  Obligations to respect a right obliges the state to 
refrain from actions that would violate the right or impede its enjoyment. The obligation to 
“ensure” a right implies more positive obligations, including a duty to take positive steps toward 
the enjoyment of the right as well as to protect individuals from abuses of the right committed by 
third parties.  The obligation to “fulfil” a right may require a state party to undertake an 
expenditure of resources to actively promote the enjoyment of the right and otherwise create the 
conditions necessary for the full enjoyment of the right.  These latter types of obligations may be 
difficult, if not impossible, to realize extraterritorially in situations in which there is another 
sovereign with more direct and immediate control of the instrumentalities that would normally 
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ensure and promote those rights, such as schools, courts, etc.  The obligation to respect a 
particular right, however, is always within the control of the state, even when it acts 
extraterritorially.
110
  Accordingly, a proportional approach would place duties to respect rights on 
states on a lesser showing of territorial or physical control than duties to ensure rights.  
Human rights bodies are increasingly comfortable with the idea of a sliding scale of rights and 
obligations that hinges on the particular circumstances of the foreign state’s presence and actions 
within the territorial state.
111
  The greater the degree of presence, power, and control, the more 
obligations might apply.
112
  And, extraterritorial obligations might apply to fundamental rights 
on a lesser showing of presence than to other rights.  Such an approach maps nicely onto the 
taxonomy of scenarios set forth above.  In particular, extraterritorial custodial cases are relatively 
easy; under those circumstances, the custodial state is entirely capable of protecting a number of 
rights that are implicated by such situations (e.g., the right to physical integrity and to be free 
from torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment; certain due process rights to fair 
notice and judicial review; and the right to equal protection and to be free from discrimination on 
invidious grounds).  While these rights can be certainly guaranteed by the custodial state, it 
would be unreasonable to expect that state to accord the entire range of human rights to detainees 
as well as to other individuals within a foreign territory who occupy a different relationship with 
the foreign state.  These individuals are no less rights bearing, but they must assert those rights 
against their national sovereign.  Human rights bodies have proven themselves perhaps more 
comfortable assigning obligations to investigate extraterritorial rights violations when the state’s 
responsibility for the violation itself is not at issue.
113
  The downside of moving away from the 
idea of indivisibility is that it becomes necessary to determine the applicability of each and every 
right and obligation in the circumstances at bar. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Although this jurisprudence started with a simple presumption that human rights obligations are 
essentially territorial, over the years the recognized exceptions—borne of compelling fact 
patterns involving manifestly harmful extraterritorial state action in situations in which the state 
was perfectly capable of respecting the right in question—have proliferated.  Like beads of 
mercury, these exceptions have coalesced into a generalized doctrine of extraterritorial 
application.  The current state of the law would thus dictate that human rights obligations exist 
wherever a state exercises de facto authority or control over territory, individuals, or a 
                                                          
110
 Marko Milanovic, Foreign Surveillance and Human Rights, Part 3: Models of Extraterritorial Application, 
EJIL:TALK!, http://www.ejiltalk.org/foreign-surveillance-and-human-rights-part-3-models-of-extraterritorial-
application (“The rationale for not limiting negative obligations is that states are always perfectly able of complying 
with them, since they remain in full control of their own organs and agents.”).  
111
 Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia, ECHR [GC], Judgment, Case No. 48787/99 (July 8, 2004), ¶ 313 
(noting that human rights “obligations remain even where the exercise of the State’s authority is limited in part of its 
territory, so that it has a duty to take all the appropriate measures which it is still within its power to take.”).  But see 
MILANOVIC, supra note ___, at 107 (critiquing the Court in Ilaşcu for placing positive obligations on Moldova 
toward persons present in an area where it enjoys title but not control).  
112
 Al-Skeini, supra note ___, at ¶ 137 (“It is clear that, whenever the State through its agents exercises control and 
authority over an individual, and thus jurisdiction, the State is under an obligation under Article 1 to secure to that 
individual the rights and freedoms under Section 1 of the Convention that are relevant to the situation of that 
individual.  In this sense, therefore, the Convention rights can be ‘divided and tailored’”) (citations removed).  
113
 See, e.g., Al-Skeini, supra note ___ (involving the United Kingdom’s duty to investigate); Xhavara, supra note 
___ (involving Italy’s duty to investigate).  
24 
 
transaction and has the power to respect and ensure the enjoyment of rights and freedoms.  The 
proposition that human rights obligations apply extraterritorially to situations of occupation and 
detention is close to categorical, with situations involving lesser territorial or personal control 
being subject to more of a case-by-case analysis that turns on the particular facts and the degree 
of control exercised.  The state-agent-authority test is likewise easiest to apply in situations in 
which the putative victim was in detention or otherwise in the sole custody of the extraterritorial 
state.  It remains more contested as the state becomes increasingly remote from the victim.  Both 
tests can be assimilated under the aegis of a test premised on capacity: if the state has the 
capacity to both violate and rectify the violation of the right, then the obligation to respect that 
right applies extraterritorially. The United States’ categorical position on extraterritoriality can 
be evaluated against this doctrinal backdrop.  
 
D. The United States 
 
Although not subject to the ECHR, or to any institution with the power to enforce its judgment or 
views against it, the United States does have treaty obligations requiring it to undertake periodic 
reporting and defend its policies and actions before human rights experts bodies, such as the 
HRC and the Committee Against Torture, and also to respond to individual petitions before the 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.
114
  Most claims alleging that the United States 
has not adhered to its human rights obligations while acting extraterritorially involve situations 
of armed conflict in which deployed U.S. troops and other personnel have caused harm.  In its 
filings in response to such claims before the various human rights bodies, the United States 
originally relied on the argument that these institutions lacked competence over factual scenarios 
governed by IHL as a function of their subject matter jurisdiction limitations.  In any case, it has 
argued that its human rights obligations are suspended in armed conflict situations governed by 
IHL—the lex specialis.  To the extent that United States addressed these issues at all, it did so 
only as a matter of “courtesy” rather than out of a sense of legal compulsion.115  Since 1995 in 
the HRC, however, the United States has more expressly advanced the additional jurisdictional 
defense that its human rights obligations do not apply extraterritorially under any circumstances.  
 
Even prior to the initiation of so-called Global War on Terror, the United States has been subject 
to claims premised on extraterritorial human rights obligations.  Most importantly, the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights received several petitions against the United States 
involving operations in Haiti, Grenada, and Panama.  By way of a jurisdictional defense in the 
Coard case—which involved allegations following the invasion of Grenada that the U.S. troops 
had mistreated individuals in detention and then manipulated the judicial system to deprive them 
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of a fair trial
116—the United States argued that the impugned detentions were consistent with the 
applicable IHL, which the Commission had no mandate or expertise to apply.
117
  The 
extraterritorial application vel non of the American Declaration, which contains no territorial or 
jurisdictional limitation,
118
 was not briefed by the parties.  Nonetheless, the Commission noted 
sua sponte:  
 
While the extraterritorial application of the American Declaration has not been 
placed at issue by the parties, the Commission finds it pertinent to note that, under 
certain circumstances, the exercise of its jurisdiction over acts with an extra-
territorial locus will not only be consistent with, but required by, the norms which 
pertain. … Given that individual rights inhere simply by virtue of a person’s 
humanity, each American State is obliged to uphold the protected rights of any 
person subject to its jurisdiction. While this most commonly refers to persons 
within a state’s territory, it may, under given circumstances, refer to conduct with 
an extraterritorial locus where the person concerned is present in the territory of 
one state, but subject to the control of another state—usually through the acts of 
the latter’s agents abroad. In principle, the inquiry turns not on the presumed 
victim’s nationality or presence within a particular geographic area, but on 
whether, under the specific circumstances, the State observed the rights of a 
person subject to its authority and control.
119
 
 
Following these early cases, the United States’ detention program on the Guantánamo Bay Naval 
Base and its operations in Afghanistan and other theaters brought to the fore additional such 
claims.  For example, lawyers representing individuals detained on Guantánamo sought 
precautionary measures (i.e., injunctive relief) from the Inter-American Commission.  At the 
outset, the United States raised multiple jurisdictional arguments: that the Commission was 
without jurisdiction to issue precautionary measures against a state not party to the Inter-
American Convention; that the Commission had no jurisdiction over claims governed by IHL,
120
 
which governs the capture and detention of enemy combatants in armed conflict; and that the 
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petitioners failed to exhaust local remedies.
121
  In responding to the United States’ lex specialis 
argument, the Commission adopted what amounts to an authority and control test to justify its 
exercise of jurisdiction:  
 
where persons find themselves within the authority and control of a state and 
where a circumstance of armed conflict may be involved, their fundamental rights 
may be determined in part by reference to international humanitarian law as well 
as international human rights law. … In short, no person, under the authority and 
control of a state, regardless of his or her circumstances, is devoid of legal 
protection for his or her fundamental and non-derogable rights.
122
   
 
The precautionary measures imposed with respect to all the detainees were twice extended in 
2005 and again in 2013 (the latter on the Commission’s own initiative), although these have had 
little apparent force or effect on U.S. policy.
123
  In an individual petition brought on behalf of an 
Algerian detainee, Djamel Ameziane, the Commission considered the petitioner to be within the 
United States’ jurisdiction during three distinct phases: his capture in Pakistan, his temporary 
detention in a U.S. airbase in Kandahar, and his continued detention on Guantanamo.  In so 
holding, the Commission reasoned that throughout this time period, the United States and its 
agents exercised exclusive physical power and control over the petitioner.
124
  
   
This issue has arisen in the Committee Against Torture (CAT) with respect to the Convention 
Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment.  In its 
Second Periodic Report, which was due in 2001 but filed in 2005, the United States provided 
extensive information regarding its overseas operations in Afghanistan and Iraq with little 
discussion of the extraterritorial application vel non of the Torture Convention.
125
  Nonetheless, 
in its responses to questions from the CAT, the United States noted that many legal obligations 
within the treaty (such as the non-refoulement principle) do “not apply to activities undertaken 
outside of the ‘territory under [the] jurisdiction’ of the United States.  The United States does not 
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accept the concept that ‘de facto control’ equates to territory under its jurisdiction.”126 In its 
Concluding Observations, the CAT rejected the lex specialis argument and noted that the treaty 
applies to “all areas under the de facto effective control of the State Party, by whichever military 
or civil authorities such control is exercised.” It deemed “regrettable” the United States’ contrary 
views that the treaty applies only to states’ de jure territory.127  In its combined Third, Fourth, 
and Fifth Report, the United States did not go into detail on the territorial scope of the treaty; it 
did, however, provide information on a range of offshore activities—such as overseas detention 
and intelligence operations—as if it had conceded the treaty’s extraterritorial application.128   
 
Turning to the Human Rights Committee, in the United States’ first periodic submission to the 
HRC in 1994,
129
 there was no mention of any territorial limitations, even though the Committee 
had already pronounced on several fact patterns involving extraterritorial conduct by states 
parties.
130
  By the time of the HRC hearing, however, the United States was involved in military 
operations in Haiti, and a challenge had been lodged against the high-seas interdiction of Haitian 
refugees.
131
  In its oral presentation, the United States delegation argued that the obligations of 
the treaty are limited to a party’s territory by virtue of the formulation of Article 2(1) and the 
intent of drafters.
132
 In its Concluding Observations, the HRC took issue with this position and 
critiqued the United States’ refusal to provide any information on its overseas operations.133   
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In 2005, the United States filed its combined Second and Third Report (after being in arrears) in 
the HRC.
134
  In this report, the United States offered its analysis of the territorial limitations of 
the ICCPR, including the conjunctive interpretation of Article 2(1), and concluded that: 
 
[T]he obligations assumed by a State Party to the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights apply only within the territory of the State Party.
135
 
 
Because in its estimation the text was clear, the United States asserted that there was no need to 
resort to the travaux préparatoires as an interpretative device.  Nonetheless, it argued that the 
records indicated that “within its territory” was included within Article 2(1) to “make clear that 
states would not be obligated to ensure the rights recognized therein outside their territories.”136  
In response to questions about the legal status of persons detained in Afghanistan, Guantánamo, 
Iraq, and elsewhere, the United States advanced lex specialis arguments to the effect that the 
“legal status and treatment of such persons is governed by the law of war.”137  The HRC 
contested these claims in its Concluding Observations.
138
  In its 2008 follow-up comments, the 
United States maintained its position that the ICCPR does not apply extraterritorially, but it did 
provide some of the information requested “as a courtesy” to the Committee, including on 
“matters outside the scope of the Covenant,” such as detention operations on Guantánamo and 
elsewhere.
139
 
 
In its 2011 Fourth Periodic Report to the HRC,
140
 the United States took note of the Concluding 
Observations of the HRC, including the recommendation that it “review its approach to the 
interpretation of the Covenant.”141  It then proceeded to largely back off its prior position that 
international human rights law does not apply to situations governed by IHL.  In particular, the 
United States averred: 
 
With respect to the application of the Covenant and the international law of armed 
conflict (also referred to as international humanitarian law or “IHL”), the United 
States has not taken the position that the Covenant does not apply “in time of 
war.” Indeed, a time of war does not suspend the operation of the Covenant to 
matters within its scope of application.
142
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The United States continued by noting that “typically” it is IHL that regulates the conduct of 
states in armed conflict situations, according to the doctrine of lex specialis. In the next breath, 
however, the U.S. submission stated: 
 
In this context, it is important to bear in mind that international human rights law 
and the law of armed conflict are in many respects complementary and mutually 
reinforcing. These two bodies of law contain many similar protections [such as 
the prohibition against torture].
143
 
 
Later, the submission noted that the choice of law question is context- and fact-specific: 
 
Determining the international law rule that applies to a particular action taken by 
a government in the context of an armed conflict is a fact-specific determination, 
which cannot be easily generalized, and raises especially complex issues in the 
context of non-international armed conflicts occurring within a State’s own 
territory.
144
 
 
The Fourth Periodic Report was not, by contrast, as forthcoming or progressive when it comes to 
the extraterritorial application of human rights obligations.  After coyly acknowledging its prior 
position against extraterritoriality, the United States specifically took notice of three important 
legal sources setting forth the contrary view. The paragraph states in full: 
 
The United States in its prior appearances before the Committee has articulated 
the position that article 2(1) would apply only to individuals who were both 
within the territory of a State Party and within that State Party’s jurisdiction. The 
United States is mindful that in General Comment 31 (2004) the Committee 
presented the view that “States Parties are required by article 2, paragraph 1, to 
respect and to ensure the Covenant rights to all persons who may be within their 
territory and to all persons subject to their jurisdiction. This means that a State 
party must respect and ensure the rights laid down in the Covenant to anyone 
within the power or effective control of that State Party, even if not situated 
within the territory of the State Party.” The United States is also aware of the 
jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”), which has found the 
ICCPR “applicable in respect of acts done by a State in the exercise of its 
jurisdiction outside its own territory,” as well as positions taken by other States 
Parties.
145
 
 
These passages suggest both a more relaxed understanding of the relationship between IHL and 
human rights law and an imperative to harmonize legal obligations when there is no direct 
contradiction between them.  In addition, the submission suggests that it is the United States’ 
view that there may be aspects of a state’s conduct that are, in fact, governed by human rights 
law, even during situations of armed conflicts—all of which are taking place outside of United 
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States’ territory.  This implies the majority conflict-of-laws position that human rights law can be 
employed as an interpretive aid to add content to undefined terms in IHL, such as “judicial 
guarantees” and “humane treatment,” or to expound upon treaty obligations, as in situations of 
occupation or detention when the occupying state exercises plenary power over territory or 
individuals.  Although the United States also indicated a willingness to engage in further 
dialogue on these issues,
146
 the United States declined to elaborate in response to the HRC’s list 
of priority issues prepared in advance of its “constructive dialogue” with the Committee now 
scheduled for March 2014.
147
   
 
E. The Way Forward  
 
Two distinct trends are apparent in the above account.  The first is the gradual convergence of 
the law emerging from the various human rights courts and experts bodies that have been 
confronted with the question of when states’ human rights obligations apply abroad.  According 
to this jurisprudence, these obligations apply whenever a state’s agents or instrumentalities 
exercise control, authority, or power over the individuals whose rights are in jeopardy, such as by 
virtue of states’ control of territory, their custody of the individuals in question, their practical 
ability to respect and ensure rights, or their essential role in a causal chain leading to the 
violations.  Although this approach is still somewhat in flux in the ECHR, the extent to which 
these obligations apply extraterritorially is increasingly calibrated to the degree of control the 
state exercises over the situation in question.  Obligations to respect rights, which can be adhered 
to whenever and wherever states act, attach sooner than obligations to ensure or fulfil rights, 
which may require the ability to mobilize an array of state institutions that is unavailable to states 
when they act offshore.  The second trend is the growing isolation of the United States in its 
categorical position that its human rights obligations have no extraterritorial application in light 
of the text of the relevant instruments and the intentions of the drafters.     
 
Although the United States has since the Bush Administration endeavored to preserve this legal 
argument, it is time to change course.  The United States should use the opportunity of the 
upcoming Human Rights Committee hearings to relinquish this increasingly untenable and 
ultimately pointless position.  By accepting the graduated and fact-specific approach uniformly 
adopted by the human rights bodies, the United States can preserve its ability to argue that its 
obligations do not apply in particular situations, while accepting that they do apply in other well-
established contexts that should be uncontroversial, even for the United States—viz. when the 
state exercises plenary authority and control over territory within the borders of another state or 
when the state holds individuals abroad in its exclusive custody.   
 
Although every litigator endeavors to win on threshold jurisdictional defenses, relinquishing this 
particular argument is unlikely to significantly disadvantage the United States since it will retain 
a number of more compelling defenses down the rhetorical cascade.  In particular, in the most 
critical NIAC scenarios, the United States can focus its energies on bolstering its lex specialis 
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argument by educating human rights institutions on its views as to the reach of IHL.  Moreover, 
it has well-developed arguments on the merits as to why its conduct either does not run afoul of 
its human rights obligations or is otherwise justified.   The receptivity of these bodies to more 
substantive arguments will be enhanced with the distraction of an antagonistic extraterritoriality 
argument out of the way.  Indeed, it could be argued that because the policies so often at issue 
here are so momentous, the United States should be willing set aside hyper-legalized stratagems 
altogether and defend its actions on the merits.  
 
To be sure, the United States uniquely vulnerable to claims that it has violated the rights of 
individuals abroad given the degree to which it has stationed troops and other personnel abroad 
and the nature of the armed conflicts and counter-terrorism operations in which it is engaged.  
And yet, in considering this proposal, the United States should keep some perspective.  The 
United States is not subject to any human rights court or tribunal with the power to enforce a 
judgment against it.  And, the option of simply ignoring, or acknowledging while opposing, the 
pronouncements of a treaty body is always available to the United States.  To be sure, there are 
costs to a finding of responsibility by a human rights institution and to refusing to bring its 
conduct more fully into compliance with its views.  These include reputational costs (such as loss 
of prestige) and damage to the United States’ self-image as a rights-respecting nation that 
adheres to the rule of law.  And yet, the concrete implications that would follow from 
abandoning an increasingly strained argument are minimal, particularly given that the United 
States is already subject to many of the same legal rules by virtue of other treaties, such as the 
Geneva Conventions, whose extraterritorial application is uncontested.
148
   
 
In any case, a fervent fealty to this legal position is having little practical effect.  The United 
States’ actions overseas are already subject to searching review by these human rights bodies.149  
The United States has largely consented to this process, “as a courtesy.”  This attitude no doubt 
reflects a certain degree of deference to these institutions and to other elements of the 
international community, but also the pragmatic recognition that responding to allegations of 
serious abuses with a weak jurisdictional defense followed by silence on the merits will be 
counter-productive.  At the same time, a willingness to respond vigorously to allegations on the 
merits offers the United States a forum to advance its legal justifications for its actions, proffer 
factual details and clarifications, address common misconceptions and hyperbole, announce 
important reforms to law and policy, and admit that our record is not perfect.
150
  Indeed, the U.S. 
interventions have been increasingly humble in light of the serious allegations at issue,
151
 while 
at the same time, defending U.S. actions when justified.
152
  The United States has come a long 
way in its willingness to report on, and entertain questions about, its overseas activities; reverting 
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to total silence is no longer a realistic option.  As such, it is unclear why the United States feels 
so compelled to preserve this argument.   
 
Indeed, the proposed change of course may inure to the United States’ benefit in other ways.  In 
addition to enhancing the legitimacy of its other arguments, accepting this case-by-case approach 
will ensure that the United States’ position is better aligned with the views of, and obligations 
placed on, its coalition partners and other allies.  As a practical matter, when the United States 
acts in coalition, it needs to harmonize its actions with its allies who increasingly accept—some 
more grudgingly than others—that they are bound by their human rights obligations when they 
operate abroad.  For many of these allies, this includes obligations under the European 
Convention and its more robust enforcement regime.
153
  Subjecting the United States to the same 
legal framework as our allies will encourage collaboration by ensuring that all parties involved in 
a particular operation or transaction will be judged by the same standards and have the same 
potential exposure to censure.
154
 
 
Finally, perhaps the most compelling reason for the United States to adopt a different approach is 
deontological: because it is the right thing to do.  A global human rights system that allows states 
to act without constraints when they are offshore is untenable.  It would invite impunity and, 
worse, the outsourcing of violations, particularly in this era of globalization.  Some measure of 
extraterritorial application ensures that states’ human rights obligations follow them when they 
exercise control, power, or authority over territory, persons, or transactions abroad.  All that said, 
it will obviously be difficult for the United States to give up an argument that has become almost 
axiomatic in its interventions in human rights fora.  This may be all the more so without a 
permanent Legal Adviser in place in the U.S. State Department.  Nonetheless, the time has come 
for the United States to relinquish a legal argument that is neither persuasive, efficacious, nor 
beneficial.   
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